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1 Introduction
The relevance of power law distributions of firm sizes to help understand firm and economic
growth has been recognized early, for instance by Schumpeter (1934), who proposed that there
might be important links between firm size distributions and firm growth. The endogenous and
exogenous processes and factors that combine to shape the distribution of firm sizes can be
expected to be at least partially revealed by the characteristics of the distribution of firm sizes.
The distribution of firm sizes has also attracted a great deal of attention in the recent policy
debate (Eurostat, 1998, for instance), because it may influence job creation and destruction
(Davis et al., 1996), the response of the economy to monetary shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994) and might even be an important determinant of productivity growth at the macroeconomic
level due to the role of market structure (Peretto, 1999; Pagano and Schivardi, 2003; Acs et al.,
1999).
This article presents a reduced form model that provides a generic explanation for the ubiq-
uitous stylized observation of power law distributions of firm sizes, and in particular of Zipf’s
law – i.e., the fact that the fraction of firms of an economy whose sizes S are larger than s is
inversely proportional to s: Pr(S > s) ∼ s−m, with m equal (or close) to 1. We consider an
economy made of a large number of firms that are created according to a random birth flow,
disappear when failing to remain above a viable size, go bankrupt when an operational fault
strikes, and grow or shrink stochastically at each time step proportionally to their current sizes
(Gibrat law).
Our contribution to the ongoing debate on the shape of the distribution of firms’ sizes is to
present a theory that encompasses previous approaches and to derive Zipf’s law as the result of
the combination of simple but realistic stochastic processes of firms’ birth and death together
with Gibrat’s law (Gibrat, 1931). The main result of our approach is that Zipf’s law is associated
with a maximum sustainable growth of investments in the creation of new firms. In this respect,
the size distribution of firms appears as a device to assess the efficiency and the sustainability
of the resources allocation process of an economy. Another interesting aspect of our framework
is the analysis of deviations from the pure Zipf’s law (case m = 1) under a variety of circum-
stances resulting from transient imbalances between the average growth rate of incumbent firms
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and the growth rate of investments in new entrant firms. These deviations from the pure Zipf’s
law have been documented for a variety of firm’s size proxies (e.g. sales, incomes, number of
employees, or total assets), and reported values for m ranges from 0.8 to 1.2 (Ijri and Simon,
1977; Sutton, 1997; Axtell, 2001, among many others). Our approach provides a framework for
identifying their possible (multiple) origins.
In the literature on the growth dynamics of business firms, a well established tradition de-
scribes the change of the firm’s size, over a given period of time, as the cumulative effect of a
number of different shocks originated by the diverse accidents that affected the firm in that pe-
riod (Kalecki, 1945; Ijri and Simon, 1977; Steindl, 1965; Sutton, 1998; Geroski, 2000, among
others). This, together with Gibrat’s law of proportional growth, forms the starting point for
various attempts to explain Zipf’s law. However, these attempts generally start with the implicit
or explicit assumption that the set of firms under consideration was born at the same origin of
time and live forever (Gibrat, 1931; Gabaix, 1999; Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007a,b). This
approach is equivalent to considering that the economy is made of only one single firm and that
the distribution of firm sizes reaches a steady-state if and only if the distribution of the size of
a single firm reaches a steady state. This latter assumption is counterfactual or, even worse,
non-falsifiable.
An alternative approach to model a stationary distribution of firm sizes is to account for the
fact that firms do not all appear at the same time but are born according to a more or less regular
flow of newly created firms, as suggested by the common sense1. Simon (1955) was the first to
address this question (see also Ijri and Simon (1977)). He proposed to modify Gibrat’s model by
accounting for the entry of new firms over time as the overall industry grows. He then obtained a
steady-state distribution of firm sizes with a regularly varying upper tail whose exponentm goes
to one from above, in the limit of a vanishingly small probability that a new firm is created. This
situation is not quite relevant to explain empirical data, insofar as the convergence toward the
steady-state is then infinitely slow, as noted by Krugman (1996). More recently, Gabaix (1999)
allowed for birth of new entities, with the probability to create a new entity of a given size
being proportional to the current fraction of entities of that size and otherwise independent of
time. In fact, this assumption does not reflect the real dynamics of firms’ creation. For instance,
1See Dunne et al. (1988), Reynolds et al. (1994) or Bonaccorsi Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), among many
others, for “demographic” studies on the populations of firms.
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Bartelsman et al. (2005) document that entrant firms have a relatively small size compared with
the more mature efficient size they develop as they grow. It seems unrealistic to expect a non-
zero probability for the birth of a firm of very large size, say, of size comparable to the largest
capitalization currently in the market2. In this respect, Luttmer (2007)’s model is more realistic
than Gabaix’s, (who anyway models city sizes rather than firms) insofar as it considers that
entrant firms adopt a scaled-down version of the technology of incumbent firms and therefore
endogenously set the size of entrant firms as a fraction of the size of operating firms. In this
article, we partly follow this view and consider that the size of entrant firms is smaller than the
size of incumbent firms. But we depart from Luttmer’s because the size of new entrants is not
endogenously fixed in our model. We set this parameter exogenously for versatility reasons.
Another crucial ingredient characterizes our model. The fact that firms can go bankrupt
and disappear from the economy is a crucial observation that is often neglected in models.
Many firms are known to undergo transient periods of decay which, when persistent, may ul-
timately lead to their exit from business (Bonaccorsi Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Knaup,
2005; Brixy and Grotz, 2007; Bartelsman et al., 2005). Simon (1960) as well as Steindl (1965)
have considered this stylized fact within a generalization of Simon (1955) where the decline
of a firm and ultimately its exit occurs when its size reaches zero. In Simon (1960)’s model,
the rate of firms’ exit exactly compensates the flow of firms’ births so that the economy is sta-
tionary and the steady-state distribution of firm sizes exhibit the same upper tail behavior as in
Simon (1955). In contrast, Steindl (1965) includes births and deaths but within an industry with
a growing number of firms. A steady-state distribution is obtained whose tail follows a power
law with an exponent that depends on the net entry rate of new firms and on the average growth
rate of incumbent firms. Zipf’s law is only recovered in the limit where the net entry rate of
new firms goes to zero. Both models rely on the existence of a minimum size below which a
firm runs out of business. This hypothesis corresponds to the existence of a minimum efficient
size below which a firm cannot operate, as is well established in economic theory. However,
there may be in general more than one minimum size as the exit (death) level of a firm has
no reason to be equal to the size of a firm at birth. In the afore mentioned models, these two
sizes are assumed to be equal, while there is a priori no reason for such an assumption and
2We do not consider spin-off’s or M&A (mergers and acquisitions).
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empirical evidence a contrario. In our model, we allow for two different thresholds, the first
one for the typical size of entrant firms and the second one for the exit level. This second level
is assumed to be lower than the first one, even if recent evidence seems to suggest that firms
might enter with a size less than their minimum efficient size (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001)
and then rapidly grow beyond this threshold in order to survive.
In addition to the exit of a firm resulting from its value decreasing below a certain level, it
sometimes happens that a firm encounters financial troubles while its asset value is still fairly
high. One could cite the striking examples of Enron Corp. and Worldcom, whose market cap-
italization were supposedly high (actually the result of inflated total asset value of about $11
billion for Worldcom and probably much higher for Enron) when they went bankrupt. More
recently, since mid-2007 and over much of 2008, the cascade of defaults and bankruptcies (or
near bankruptcies) associated with the so-called subprime crisis by some of the largest financial
and insurance companies illustrates that shocks in the network of inter-dependencies of these
companies can be sufficiently strong to destabilize them. Beyond these trivial examples, there
is a large empirical literature on firm entries and exits, that suggests the need for taking into ac-
count the existence of failure of large firms (Dunne et al., 1988, 1989; Bartelsman et al., 2005).
To the extent that the empirical literature documents a sizable exit at all size categories, we
suggest that it is timely to study a model with both firm exit at a size lower bound and due to a
size-independent hazard rate. Such a model constitutes a better approximation to the empirical
data than a model with only firm exit at the lower bound. Gabaix (1999) briefly considers an
analogous situation (at least from a formal mathematical perspective) and suggests that it may
have an important impact on the shape of the distribution of firm sizes.
To sum up, we consider an economy of firms undergoing continuous stochastic growth
processes with births and deaths playing a central role at time scales as short as a few years. We
argue that death processes are especially important to understand the economic foundation of
Zipf’s law and its robustness. In order to make our model closer to the data, we consider two
different mechanisms for the exit of a firm: (ı) when the firm’s size becomes smaller than a given
minimum threshold and (ıı) when an exogenous shock occurs, modeling for instance operational
risks, independently of the size of the firm. The other important issue is to describe adequately
the birth process of firms. As a counterpart to the continuously active death process, we will
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consider that firms appear according to a stochastic flow process that may depend on macro-
economic variables and other factors. The assumptions underpinning this model as well as the
main results derived from it are presented in section 2. Section 3 puts them in perspective in
the light of recent theoretical models and empirical findings on the existence of deviations from
Zipf’s law. Section 4 provides complementary results which are important from an empirical
point of view. All the proofs are gathered in the appendix at the end of the article.
2 Exposition of the model and main results
2.1 Model setup
We consider a reduced form model, with a first set of three assumptions, in which firms are cre-
ated at random times ti’s with initial random asset values si0’s drawn from some given statistical
distribution. More precisely:
Assumption 1. There is a flow of firm entry, with births of new firms following a Poisson
process with exponentially varying intensity ν(t) = ν0 · ed·t, with d ∈ R;
This assumption generalizes most previous approaches that address the question of model-
ing the size distribution of firms. In the basic model of Gabaix (1999) or in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright
(2007a,b), all firms (or cities) are supposed to enter at the same time, which is technically equiv-
alent to consider that there is only one firm in the economy. In Simon’s models and in Luttmer
(2007), a flow of firms birth is considered, but births occur deterministically at discrete time
steps (Simon) or continuously in time (Luttmer). Assumption 1 allows for a random flow of
birth.
As will be clear later on, the value of the parameter ν0 is not really relevant for the un-
derstanding of the shape of the distribution of firm sizes. In contrast, the parameter d, which
characterizes the growth or the decline of the intensity of firm births, plays a key role insofar as
it is directly related to the net growth rate of the population of firms.
We also assume that the entry size of a new incumbent firm is random, with a typical size
which is time varying in order to account for changing installment costs, for instance. The size
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of a firm can represent its assets value, but for most of the developments in this article, the size
could be measured as well by the number of employees or the sales revenues.
Assumption 2. At time ti, i ∈ N, the initial size of the new entrant firm i is given by si0 =
s0,i · ec0ti , c0 ∈ R. The random sequence {s0,i}i∈N is the result of independent and identically
distributed random draws from a common random variable s˜0. All the draws are independent
of the entry dates of the firms.
This assumption exogenously sets the size of entrant firms. It departs from Gabaix (1999)
generalized model and Luttmer (2007) model by considering a distribution of initial firm sizes
that is unrelated to the distribution of already existing firms. Besides, it does not imposes that
all the firms enter with the same (minimum) size, as in Simon (1960) or Steindl (1965) which
are retrieved by choosing a degenerated distribution of entrant firms and c0 = 0. As we shall see
later on, apart from the growth rate c0 of the typical size of a new entrant firm, the characteristics
of the distribution of initial firm sizes is, to a large extent, irrelevant for the shape of the upper
tail of the steady-state distribution of firm sizes.
Remark 1. As a consequence of assumptions 1 and 2, the average capital inflow per unit time
– i.e. the average amount of capital invested in the creation of new firms per unit time – is
dI(t) = ν(t)E [s˜0] e
c0t dt , (1)
= ν0E [s˜0] e
(d+c0)t dt , (2)
and d+ c0 appears as the average growth rate of investment in new firms.
As usual, we also assume that
Assumption 3. Gibrat’s rule holds.
Assumption 3 means that, in the continuous time limit, the size Si(t) of the ith firm of the
economy at time t ≥ ti, conditional on its initial size si0, is solution to the stochastic differential
equation
dSi(t) = Si(t) (µ dt+ σ dWi(t)) , t ≥ ti , Si(ti) = si0 . (3)
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The drift µ of the process can be interpreted as the rate of return or the ex-ante growth rate of
the firm. Its volatility is σ and Wi(t) is a standard Wiener process. Note that the drift µ and the
volatility σ are the same for all firms.
This assumption together with assumption 1 extends Simon’s model by allowing the creation
of new firms at random times, as already mentioned, and more importantly decouples the growth
process of existing firms from the process of creation of new firms. It thus makes the model
more realistic.
Let us now consider two exit mechanisms, based on the following empirical facts. Referring
to Bonaccorsi Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), the yearly rate of death of Italian firms is, on
average, equal to 5.7% with a maximum of about 20% for some specific industry branches.
Knaup (2005) examined the business survival characteristics of all establishments that started
in the United States in the late 1990s when the boom of much of that decade was not yet
showing signs of weakness, and finds that, if 85% of firms survive more than one year, only
45% survive more than four years. Brixy and Grotz (2007) analysed the factors that influence
regional birth and survival rates of new firms for 74 West German regions over a 10-year period.
They documented significant regional factors as well as variability in time: the 5-year survival
rate fluctuates between 45% and 51% over the period from 1983 to 1992. Bartelsman et al.
(2005) confirmed that a large number of firms enter and exit most markets every year in a group
of ten OECD countries: data covering the first part of the 1990s show the firm turnover rate
(entry plus exit rates) to be between 15 and 20 percents in the business sector of most countries,
i.e., a fifth of firms are either recent entrants, or will close down within the year.
First of all, we assume that firms disappear when their asset values become smaller than
some pre-specified minimum level smin.
Assumption 4. There exists a minimum firm size smin(t) = s1 · ec1·t, that varies at the constant
rate c1 ≤ c0, below which firms exit.
This idea has been considered in several models of firm growth (see e.g. de Wit (2005)
and references therein) and can be related to the existence of a minimum efficient size in the
presence of fixed operating costs. Besides, as for the typical size of new entrant firms, we
assume that the minimum size of incumbent firms grows at the constant rate c1 ≥ 0, so that
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smin(t) := s1e
c1·t
. But c1 is a priori different from c0. It is natural to require that the lower
bound s0 of the distribution of s˜0 be larger than s1 and that c0 ≥ c1 in order to ensure that no
new firm enters the economy with an initial size smaller than the minimum firm size and then
immediately disappears3. The condition s1ec1·t < s0ec0·t implies that the economy started at a
time t0 larger than
t∗ =
1
c1 − c0 · ln
(
s0
s1
)
< 0 . (4)
We could alternatively choose s0 = s1 so that the economy starts at time t = 0. Another
approach, suggested for instance by Gabaix (1999), considers that firms cannot decline below
a minimum size and remain in business at this size until they start growing up again. Here, we
have not used this rather artificial mechanism.
Secondly, we consider that firms may disappear abruptly as the result of an unexpected
large event (operational risk, fraud,...), even if their sizes are still large. Indeed, while it has
been established that a first-order characterization for firm death involves lower failure rates
for larger firms (Dunne et al., 1988, 1989), Bartelsman et al. (2005) also state that, for suffi-
ciently old firms, there seems to be no difference in the firm failure rate across size categories.
Consequently
Assumption 5. There is a random exit of firms with constant hazard rate h ≥ max{−d, 0}
which is independent of the size and age of the firm.
Remark 2. As will become clear later on, the constraint h ≥ max{−d, 0} is only necessary
to guaranty that the distribution of firm sizes is normalized in the small size limit if there is no
minimum firm size. The case d > 0 ensures that the population of firms grows at the long term
rate d while the case d < 0 allows describing an industry branch that first expands, then reaches
a maximum and eventually declines at the rate d. Such a situation is quite realistic, as illustrated
by figure 2 in Sutton (1997) which depicts the number of firms in the U.S. tire industry. Notice,
in passing, that the case h < 0 is also sensible. It corresponds to the situation considered by
Gabaix (1999) in his generalized model, where firms are allowed to enter with an initial size
randomly drawn from the size distribution of incumbent firms.
3In fact, it seems that the typical size of entrant firms is much smaller than the minimum efficient size
(Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001, and references therein). It means that two exit levels should be considered; one
for old enough firms and another one for young firms. For tractability of the calculations, we do not consider this
situation.
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Under assumptions 1 and 5, i.e. not considering for the time being the mechanism of exit of
firms at the minimum size, the average number Nt of operating firms satisfies
dNt
dt
+ hNt = ν(t), (5)
so that, assuming that the economy starts at t = 0 for simplicity, we obtain
Nt =
ν0
d+ h
[
ed·t − e−h·t] . (6)
Consequently, the rate of firm birth, given by ν(t)/Nt, is given by d+h1−e−(d+h)·t → d + h for t
large enough. The range of values of d + h has been reported in many empirical studies. For
instance, Reynolds et al. (1994) give the regional average firm birth rates (annual firm births per
100 firms) of several advanced countries in different time periods: 10.4% (France; 1981-1991),
8.6% (Germany; 1986), 9.3% (Italy; 1987-1991), 14.3% (United Kingdom; 1980-1990), 15.7%
(Sweden; 1985-1990), 6.9% (United States; 1986-1988). They also document a large variability
from one industrial sector to another. More interestingly, Bonaccorsi Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia
(2004) as well as Dunne et al. (1988) reports both the entry and exit rate for different sectors in
Italy and in the US respectively. In every cases, even if sectorial differences are reported, the
average aggregated entry and exit rates are remarquably close. This suggests that d should be
close to zero while h is about 4− 6%. The net growth rate of the population of firms, given by
1
Nt
dNt
dt
= ν(t)
Nt
− h tends to d for t large enough, as announced after assumption 1.
2.2 Results
Equipped with this set of five assumptions, we can now define
m :=
1
2

(1− 2 · µ− c0
σ2
)
+
√(
1− 2 · µ− c0
σ2
)2
+ 8 · d+ h
σ2

 , (7)
and derive our main result (see appendix A.1 for the proof):
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions 1-5, provided that E [s˜m0 ] <∞,
for t − t∗ ≫
[(
µ− σ2
2
− c0
)2
+ 2σ2(d+ h)
]−1/2
, the average distribution of firm’s sizes fol-
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lows an asymptotic power law with tail indexm given by (7), in the following sense: the average
number of firms with size larger than s is proportional to s−m as s→∞.
Remark 3. Condition E [s˜m0 ] < ∞ in Assumption 2 means that the fatness of the initial distri-
bution of firm sizes at birth is less than the natural fatness resulting from the random growth.
Such an assumption is not always satisfied, in particular in Luttmer (2007)’s model where, due
to imperfect imitation, the size of entrant firms is a fraction of the size of incumbent firms.
One can see that the tail index increases, and therefore the distribution of firm sizes becomes
thinner tailed, as µ decreases and as h, c0, and d increase. This dependence can be easily
rationalized. Indeed, the smaller the expected growth rate µ, the smaller the fraction of large
firms, hence the thinner the tail of the size distribution and the larger the tail index m. The
larger h, the smaller the probability for a firm to become large, hence a thinner tail and a larger
m. As for the impact of c0, rescaling the firm sizes by ec0·t, so that the mean size of entrant
firms remains constant, does not change the nature of the problem. The random growth of firms
is then observed in the moving frame in which the size of entrant firms remains constant on
average. Therefore, the size distribution of firms is left unchanged up to the scale factor ec0·t.
Since the average growth rate of firms in the new frame becomes µ′ = µ − c0, the larger c0,
the smaller µ′, hence the smaller the probability for a firm to become relatively larger than the
others, the thinner the tail of the distribution of firm sizes and thus the larger m. Finally, the
larger d is, the larger the fraction of young firms, which leads to a relatively larger fraction of
firms with sizes of the order of the typical size of entrant firms and thus the upper tail of the size
distribution becomes relatively thinner and m larger.
As a natural consequence of proposition 1, we can assert that
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of proposition 1, the mean distribution of firm sizes admits
a well-defined steady-state distribution which follows Zipf’s law (i.e. m = 1) if, and only if,
µ− h = d+ c0 . (8)
Remark 4. In an economy where the amount of capital invested in the creation of new firms is
constant per unit time, namely
ν(t) · s0(t) = const. , (9)
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we necessarily get d+ c0 = 0 so that the balance condition reads µ = h.
To get an intuitive meaning of the condition in corollary 1, let us state the following result
(see the proof in appendix A.2):
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of proposition 1, the long term average growth rate of
the overall economy is max {µ− h, d+ c0}.
The term d + c0 quantifies the growth rate of investments in new entrant firms, resulting
from the growth of the number of entrant firms (at the rate d) and the growth of the size of
new entrant firms (at the rate c0). The term d reflects several factors, including improving pro-
business legislation and tax laws as well as increasing entrepreneurial spirit. The latter term
c0 is essentially due to time varying installment costs, which can be negative in a pro-business
economy.
The other term µ − h represents the average growth rate of an incumbent firm. Indeed,
considering a running firm at time t, during the next instant dt, it will either exit with probability
h · dt (and therefore its size declines by a factor −100%) or grow at an average rate equal to
µ ·dt, with probability (1−h ·dt). The coefficient µ can be called the conditional growth rate of
firms, conditioned on not having died yet. Then, the expected growth rate over the small time
increment dt of an incumbent firm is (µ−h) ·dt+O (dt2). As shown by the following equation,
drawn from appendix A.2, the average size of the economy Ω(t) (if we neglect the exit of firms
by lack of a sufficient size) reads
Ω(t) =
∫ t
0
e(µ−h)·(t−u)dI(u) , (10)
where I(t) is the average capital inflow invested in the creation of news firms per unit time (see
eq. 2). Thus µ− h is also the return on investment of the economy.
Thus, the long term average growth of the economy is driven either by the growth of invest-
ments in new firms, whenever d + c0 > µ − h, or by the growth of incumbent firms, whenever
µ − h > d + c0. The former case does not really make sense, on the long run. Indeed, it
would mean that the growth of investments in new firms can be sustainably larger than the rate
of return of the economy. Such a situation can only occur if we assume that the economy is
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fueled by an inexhaustible source of capital, which is obviously unrealistic. As a consequence,
it is safe to assume µ − h ≥ d + c0 on the long run. The regime d + c0 > µ − h might how-
ever describe transient bubble regimes developing under unsustainably large capital creation
(Baily et al., 2008).
Proposition 3. In a growing economy whose growth is driven by that of incumbent firms, the
tail index of the size distribution is such that m ≤ 1.
Along a balanced growth path, which corresponds to a maximum sustainable growth rate of the
investment in new firms, the tail index of the size distribution is equal to one.
Proposition 3 shows that Zipf’s law characterizes an efficient and sustainable allocation of
resources among the firms of an economy. Any deviation from it is the signature of an ineffi-
ciency and/or an unsustainability of the allocation scheme. In this respect, the size distribution
of firms is a diagnostic device to assess the efficiency and the sustainability of the allocation of
resources among firms in an economy.
Proof. According to the natural assumption that the growth of the economy is driven by the
growth of incumbent firms, i.e. µ−h ≥ d+ c0, we get d+h ≤ µ− c0 and ε ≤ 1 which leads to
m ≤ 1 (see illustration on figure 1); we have used assumption 5 according to which d+ h ≥ 0
hence µ − c0 ≥ 0. On a balanced growth path, both investments in new firms and incumbent
firms grow at the same rate µ − h = d + c0, hence the growth rate of the investment in new
firms is maximum and by corollary 1 the tail index m of the size distribution equals one.
In the present framework, the crucial parameters d, c0, µ and h are exogenous. While this
is beyond the scope of the present paper, we can however surmise that, within an endogenous
theory in which the growth of investments would be naturally correlated with the growth of
the firms in the economy because the success of firms generates the cash flow at the source of
new investments, the balance growth condition (8) appears almost unavoidable for a sustainable
development. It is quite remarkable that Zipf’s law derives as the robust statistical translation
of this balance growth condition.
Remark 5. Our theory suggests two simple explanations for the empirical evidence that the
exponent m is close to 1. Either the investment in new firms is close to its maximum sustainable
13
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Figure 1: The figure shows the exponent m of the power law tail of the distribution of firm
sizes, given by (7), as a function of σ2/2
µ−c0 , for different values of the ratio ε :=
d+h
µ−c0 . Bottom to
top ε = 0.6; 0.8; 1; 1.2; 1.6.
level so that the balance condition is approximately satisfied, or the volatility σ of incumbent
firms sizes is large. Indeed, according to equation (7), the tail index m goes to one as σ goes to
infinity irrespective of the values of the parameters d, µ, c0 and h. In fact, the larger the volatility,
the larger the tolerance to the departure from the balance condition. Indeed, expanding relation
(7) for σ large, we get
m = 1− 2 · µ− h− c0 − d
σ2
+ 4 · (d+ h) (µ− h− c0 − d)
σ4
+O
(
1
σ6
)
, (11)
and for small departures from the balance condition
m = 1− 2
1 + 2d+h
σ2
·µ− c0 − h− d
σ2
+
8d+h
σ2(
1 + 2d+h
σ2
)3 ·
(
µ− c0 − h− d
σ2
)2
+O
(
(µ− c0 − h− d)3
)
.
(12)
When the volatility changes, the convergence of the size distribution toward its long-term
distribution may be faster or slower. Indeed, according to Proposition 1, the size distribution
converges to a power law when the age of the economy is large compared with
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[(
µ− σ2
2
− c0
)2
+ 2σ2(d+ h)
]−1/2
. This quantity is a decreasing function of the volatility
if (and only if) σ2
2
> (µ− c0) − 2 (d+ h). Therefore, when the volatility is large Zipf’s be-
comes more robust and the convergence towards Zipf’s law is faster.
Remark 6. The regime where m ≤ 1, which predicts an infinite mean size, seems to violate the
constraint that there is a finite amount of capital (or, employees) in the economy. This suggests
that the associated parameter ranges are just not possible in actual economies. Actually, the
regime m ≤ 1 is perfectly possible, as least in an intermediate asymptotic regime. Indeed, a
real economy which grows at a non-vanishing growth rate bounded by zero from below is finite
only because it has a finite age. As explained in section 4.2, the distribution of firm sizes in
such a finitely lived economy (arguably representing the real world) is characterized by a power
law regime with exponent m as given by Proposition 1, crossing over to a faster decay at very
large firm sizes. The cross-over regime occurs for larger and larger firm sizes as the age of
the economy increases. There is thus no contradiction between the finiteness of the amount of
capital in the economy and the power law with exponent m < 1 up to an upper domain, so
that the mean does exist. In other words, the paradox is resolved by correctly ordering the two
limits: (i) limit of larger firm sizes limS→+∞; (ii) limit of large age of the economy limθ→+∞.
The correct ordering for a finite and long-lived economy is limθ→+∞limS→+∞, which means
that, taking the limit of large firm sizes at fixed large but finite age θ leads to a finite mean,
coexisting with a power law intermediate asymptotic with exponent m given by Proposition 1.
2.3 Calibration to empirical data
According to Dunne et al. (1988, table 2), the relative size of entrant firms to incumbent firms
seems to have slightly declined during the period 1963-1982 in the US. According to our model,
the ratio of the average size of entrant firms to the average size of incumbent firms is, for large
enough time t,
s0 · ec0·t
Ωt/Nt
∼


µ−h−d−c0
d+h
· e−(µ−h−d−c0)·t, provided that µ− h > d+ c0, (a)
1
d+h
· 1
t
, provided that µ− h = d+ c0, (b)
d+h−µ+c0
d+h
, provided that µ− h < d+ c0, (c)
(13)
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where Ωt is the average size of all incumbent firms (see Appendix A.2) and Nt is the average
number of incumbent firms, at time t. The fact that Dunne et al. (1988) observe a slight decay
in the relative size of entrant firms to incumbent firms suggests that the condition of sustainable
growth µ− h > d+ c0 holds. Under this hypothesis, the calibration of equation (13.a) by OLS
gives, on an annual basis,
µ− h− d− c0 = 1.8% (1.2%) and µ− h− d− c0
d+ h
= 28% (3%). (14)
The figures within parenthesis provide the standard deviations of the estimates. As a conse-
quence, the alternative hypothesis µ−h−d−c0 ≤ 0 cannot be rejected at any usual significance
level and we cannot affirm that Dunne’s data corresponds to the regime µ− h− d− c0 > 0.
Under the second hypothesis µ−h = d−c0, equation (13.b) leads to test the null hypothesis
that the slope of the OLS regression of the logarithm of the size of entrant firms relative to the
size of incumbent firms against the logarithm of time is equal to −1. Instead, we estimate a
slope equal to −0.086 (0.068), which is therefore not significantly different from zero. Thus,
we reject the hypothesis µ− h = d− c0.
According to equation (13.c), the size of entrant firms relative to the size of incumbent firms
is constant over the period under consideration. To formally test this hypothesis, we perform
the OLS regression of the size of entrant firms versus to the size of incumbent firms against
time. We find that the hypothesis of a time dependent ratio of the size of entrant firms relative to
the size of incumbent firms is rejected at any usual significance level. We thus have to conclude
that the third alternative actually holds and we get
d+ h− µ+ c0
d+ h
= 25%. (15)
With the figures d = 0 and h = 5% obtained from Dunne et al. (1988), we obtain d+ h− µ+ c0 =
1.25% and µ− c0 = 3.75%. Thus, the balance condition is not strictly satisfied but the observed
departure from the balance condition remains weak.
To sum up, reasonable estimates of the key parameters are h = 4 − 6%, d = ±0.5%,
µ− c0 = h± 2%. As for σ, Buldyrev et al. (1997) report the standard deviations of the growth
16
rates in terms of sales, assets, cost of goods sold and plant property and equipment for US
publicly-traded companies. Buldyrev et al. (1997) find that σ ranges typically between 30% to
50%. Based upon this set of figures, relation (7) leads to a tail index m ranging between 0.7 and
1.3, in agreement with the range of values usually reported in the literature.
Proposition 1 states that the asymptotic power law of the distribution of firm sizes can be ob-
served if the age of the economy is large compared with
[(
µ− σ2
2
− c0
)2
+ 2σ2(d+ h)
]−1/2
.
With the set of parameters above, this corresponds to economies whose age is large compared
to 5 to 12 years.
3 Discussion
3.1 Comparison with Gabaix’s model
Corollary 1 seems reminiscent of the condition given by Gabaix (1999) in its basic model, which
relies on the argument that, because they are all born at the same time, firms grow – on average
– at the same rate as the overall economy. Consequently, when discounted by the global growth
rate of the economy, the average expected growth rate of the firms must be zero. Applied to
our framework, and focusing on the distribution of discounted firm sizes, this argument would
lead to µ = h, with d = c0 = c1 = 0 in order to match Gabaix’s assumptions. Gabaix (1999)’s
condition would thus seem to be equivalent to our balance condition for Zipf’s law describing
the density of firms’ sizes to hold.
Actually, this reasoning is incorrect. Consider the case where µ > h, such that the global
economy grows at the average growth rate rG = µ − h according to Proposition 2. Gabaix
(1999) proposed to measure the growth of a firm in the frame of the global economy. In this
moving frame, the conditional average growth rate of the firm is µ′ = µ − rG = h, which
indeed would suggest that the balance condition is automatically obeyed when µ is replaced
by µ′. But, one should notice that µ′ is a transformed growth rate, and not the true rate. The
average growth rate rG = µ−h of the global economy is micro-founded on the contributions of
all growing firms. It would be incorrect to insert µ′ in the statements of Proposition 1, as µ′ is the
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effective growth rate resulting from the change of frame, while our exact derivation requires the
parameters µ and h for Proposition 1 to hold. As such, nothing in our model automatically sets
the growth rate µ of firms to their death rate h, contrarily to what happens in Gabaix (1999)’s
model. The main difference that invalidates the application of Gabaix (1999)’s argument is the
stochastic flow of firm’s births and deaths.
It is important to understand that in Gabaix (1999)’s basic model, the derivation of Zipf’s
law relies crucially on a model view of the economy in which all firms are born at the same
instant. Our approach is thus essentially different since it considers the flow of firm births, as
well as their deaths, which is more in agreement with empirical evidence. Note also that the
available empirical evidence on Zipf’s law is based on analyzing cross-sectional distributions of
firm sizes, i.e., at specific times. As a consequence, the change to the global economic growth
frame, argued by Gabaix (1999), just amounts to multiplying the value of each firm by the
same constant of normalization, equal to the size of the economy at the time when the cross-
section is measured. Obviously, this normalization does not change the exponent of the power
law distribution of sizes, if it exists. Furthermore, elaborating on Krugman (1996)’s argument
about the non-convergence of the distribution of firm sizes toward Zipf’s law in Simon (1955)’s
model, Blank and Solomon (2000) have shown that Gabaix (1999)’s argument suffers from a
more technical problem. Based on the demonstration that the two limits, the number of firms
N → ∞ and smin(t)/Ω(t) → 04 (or equivalently the limit of large times t → ∞) are non-
commutative, Blank and Solomon (2000) showed that Zipf’s exponent m = 1 as obtained by
Gabaix (1999)’s argument requires (i) taking the long time limit smin(t)/Ω(t) → 0 over which
the economy made of a large but finite number N firms grows without bounds, while simul-
taneously obeying the condition (ii) N ≫ exp[Ω(t)/smin(t)]. The problem is that conditions
(i) and (ii) are mutually exclusive. Blank and Solomon (2000) showed that this inconsistency
can be resolved by allowing the number of firms to grow proportionally to the total size of the
economy.
In a generalized approach of his basic model, Gabaix accounts for the appearance of new
entities with a constant rate ν (equal to d + h with our notations) and shows (Gabaix, 1999,
Proposition 3) that, as long as this birth rate is less than the growth rate γ of existing entities (µ
4The term Ω(t) refers to the average size of the economy defined by the sum of the sizes over the population of
incumbent firms (see (69) in appendix A.2).
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or µ − h in our notations), the results of his basic model holds, i.e., Zipf’s law holds. On the
contrary, he shows that the tail index of the size distribution is equal to m given by (7) when
the birth rate of new entities is larger than their growth rate. This result seems in contradiction
with ours, as well as with Luttmer (2007)’s results, insofar as Proposition 1 states that m is
the tail index of the size distribution irrespective of the relative magnitude of the birth rate of
entrant firms and of the growth rate of incumbent ones. The discrepancy between these two
results comes from an error in Gabaix’s proof of Zipf’s law in the regime when the birth rate
of new entities is less than the growth rate of existing entities. The error consists in assuming
that young firms do not contribute at all to the shape of the tail of the size distribution when ν
is less than γ 5. Therefore, in the presence of firm entries, Gabaix’s approach does not allow to
explain Zipf’s law.
3.2 Comparison with Luttmer’s model
Based upon structural models, an important modeling strategy has been developed, starting from
Lucas (1978) and evolving to the more recent Luttmer (2007, 2008) or Rossi-Hansberg and Wright
(2007a,b) models. The distribution of firm sizes then appears as one of the properties of a
general equilibrium model, which depends on different industry parameters. In these models,
Zipf’s law is obtained as a limit case, needing a rather sharp fine tuning of the control param-
eters. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright’s model is a “one firm” model as in Gabaix (1999) and is
therefore subjected to the same restrictions. We do not discuss further this model in light of the
results of our reduced form model. In contrast, the assumptions underpinning Luttmer’s model
match the assumptions under which proposition 1 holds, which motivates a closer comparison.
5 To show that Zipf’s law holds as long as the birth rate of new entities is less than the growth rate of existing
entities, Gabaix (1999, Appendix 2) splits the population of cities in two parts: the old ones, whose age is larger
than T = t/2, and the young ones, whose age is smaller than T = t/2. In the limit of large time t, he shows that
the size distribution of old cities should follow Zipf’s law as a consequence of the results derived from his basic
model. Then he provides the following majoration of the size distribution of firms born at time τ > t/2, i.e., for
young firms: Pr [S > s|birthdate = τ ] ≤ E[S|birthdate = τ ]/s. This trivial inequality requires the expectation
E[S|birthdate = τ ] be finite. Thus, Gabaix’s derivation crucially relies on the fact that the firms whose ages are
slightly larger than t/2 are old enough for Zip’s law to hold (and thus for E[S|birthdate < t/2] to be arbitrary
large and infinite for an arbitrarily large economy which allows for the sampling of the full distribution), while the
firms whose ages are slightly less than t/2 are not old enough for Zipf’s law to hold, and therefore they still admit
a finite average size: E[S|birthdate > t/2] < ∞. It is clearly a contradiction as one cannot have simultaneously
E[S|birthdate = (t/2)+] < ∞ and Zipf’s law for times (t/2)−. This invalidates eq. (17) in Gabaix (1999)
because the integrand have to diverge as τ → T , with the notations of Gabaix article.
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Luttmer (2007) considers an economy of firms with different ages. For a firm of age a, its
size Sa follows a geometric Brownian motion
d lnSa = µ · da+ σ · dWa (16)
where the drift µ and volatility σ are derived from a micro-economic model and are related to
the price elasticity β
1−β of the demand for commodity, to the rate θE at which the productivity
of entering firms grows over time, to the trend θI of log productivity for incumbent firms, and
to the volatility σZ of the productivity:
µ =
β
1− β (θI − θE) , σ =
β
1− βσZ . (17)
Due to the presence of fixed costs, incumbent firms exit when their size reaches a constant
minimum size b and in this case only. In our notations, this implies c1 = 0 and h = 0. In
addition, Luttmer assumes that the overall number of incumbent firms grows at a rate η >
µ + σ2/2 so that the size of a typical incumbent firm is not expected to grow faster than the
population growth rate. Within our framework, the number of firms grows, on the long run,
at the rate d, so that we have the correspondence d = η. Finally, Luttmer considers that firms
enter either with a fixed size or with a size taken from the same distribution as the incumbent
firms; consequently, in our notations, we have c0 = 0. Then, by application of proposition 1, we
conclude, as in Luttmer (2007, section III.B), that the size distribution of firms follows a power
law with a tail index given by
m = − µ
σ2
+
√( µ
σ2
)2
+ 2
η
σ2
. (18)
Notice that Luttmer only considers the long term distribution of firm sizes, while our result
allows considering the transient regime which eventually leads to the power law. In particular,
accounting for the transient regime avoids resorting to the assumption η > µ + σ2/2. Indeed,
in Luttmer’s model, this assumption ensures that the tail index m remains larger than one so
that, detrended by the overall growth of the number of firms given by e+ηt, the average firm
size is finite. This is a natural requirement if the economy is assumed to be finite. This latter
assumption is more questionable in economies of infinite duration. In contrast, when finite
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time effects are considered as in our framework, the average firm size is always finite for finite
times, since the density of firm sizes decays faster than any power law beyond the intermediate
asymptotic described by the power law, whether η > µ + σ2/2 or not. In other words, the
power law is truncated by a finite time effect, as derived in appendix A.1. As time increases, the
truncation recedes progressively to infinity, thus enlarging the domain of validity of the power
law. The exact power law distribution is attained therefore for asymptotically large times (we
come back to this point latter on in section 4.2). Therefore, the constraint η > µ + σ2/2 is
not necessary anymore in our framework, since there is no reason for the average firm size to
remain finite at infinite times when the size of the overall economy becomes itself infinite.
The endogeneization of the growth rate of the productivity of entrant firms performed by
Luttmer in the second part of his article does not match our assumptions, so that we cannot
proceed further with the comparison of his results with ours. Indeed, in Luttmer’s case, the
upper tail of the distribution of entrant firms behaves as the tail of the distribution of incumbent
firms, so that assumption 2 is not satisfied.
4 Miscellaneous results
4.1 Distribution of firms’ age and declining hazard rate
Brudel et al. (1992), Caves (1998, and references therein) or Dunne et al. (1988, 1989), among
others, have reported declining hazard rates with age. Under assumption 5, the hazard rate is
constant, which seems to be counterfactual. However, we now show that the presence of the
lower barrier below which firms exit allows to account for age-dependent hazard rate.
Let us denote by θ the age of a firm at time t, i.e., the firm was born at time t−θ. Expression
(52) in appendix A.1 allows us to derive the probability that, at time t, a firm older that θ is still
alive, which corresponds to the distribution of firm ages. Indeed denoting by Θ˜t the random age
of the considered firm at time t,
Pr
[
Θ˜t > θ
]
=
∫ ∞
smin(t)
1
s
ϕ
[
ln
(
s
smin(t)
)
; t, θ
]
ds, (19)
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where 1
s
ϕ
[
ln
(
s
smin(t)
)
; t, θ
]
is the size density of firms of age θ at time t. Some algebraic
manipulations give
Pr
[
Θ˜t > θ
]
=
1
2
[
erfc
(
− ln ρ(t) + (δ − 1− δ0)τ
2
√
τ
)
(20)
− ρ(t)1−δ+δ0 · erfc
(
ln ρ(t)− (δ − 1− δ0)τ
2
√
τ
)]
, (21)
with τ := σ2
2
θ, δ := 2µ
σ2
and δ0 := 2c0σ2 .
Accounting for the independence of the random exit of a firm with hazard rate h from the
size process of the firm (assumption 5), the “total” hazard rate reads
H(t, θ) = h−
d lnPr
[
Θ˜t > θ
]
dθ
, (22)
= h+
ln
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)
·
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)− 1−δ+δ0
2 · exp
[
− ln
2
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)
+(1−δ+δ0)2τ2
4τ
]
erfc
(
− ln
s0(t)
smin(t)
+(δ−1−δ0)τ
2
√
τ
)
−
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)1−δ+δ0 · erfc( ln s0(t)smin(t)−(δ−1−δ0)τ
2
√
τ
) ,(23)
assuming, for simplicity, that the random variable s˜0 reduces to a degenerate random variable
s0. Expression (23) shows that the failure rate actually depends on firm’s age. It also depends
explicitly on the current time t through the ratio s0(t)
smin(t)
.
Let us focus on the case c0 = c1, which corresponds to the same growth rate for s0(t) and
s1(t). This allows considering arbitrarily old firms since, according to (4), the starting point of
the economy can then be t∗ = −∞. We obtain the limit result
H(t, θ) θ→∞−→


h, µ− c1 − σ22 > 0,
h+
1
2σ2
(
µ− c1 − σ
2
2
)2
, µ− c1 − σ22 ≤ 0 .
(24)
In the moving frame of the exit barrier, µ− c1 − σ22 is the drift of the log-size of a firm
d lnS(t) =
(
µ− c1 − σ
2
2
)
dt+ σdW (t). (25)
Thus, when the drift is positive, the firm escapes from the exit barrier, i.e., its size grows almost
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surely to infinity, so that the firm can only exit as the consequence of the hazard rate h. On
the contrary, when the drift is non-positive, the firm size decreases and reaches the exit barrier
almost surely, so that the firm exits either because it reaches the exit barrier or because of the
hazard rate h. Hence the result that the asymptotic total failure rate is the sum of the exogenous
hazard rate h and of the asymptotic endogenous hazard rate 1
2σ2
(
µ− c1 − σ22
)2
related to the
failure of a firm when it reaches the minimum efficient size in the absence of h 6.
Differentiating the age-dependent hazard rate given by (23) with respect to θ and using the
asymptotic expansion of the error function (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1965), we get
∂θH(t, θ) =


− 1
2σ2
(
µ− c1 − σ
2
2
)2
· H(t, θ) ·
[
1 +O
(
1
θ
)]
, µ− c1 − σ22 > 0,
−3σ
2
θ2
(
µ− c1 − σ
2
2
)−2
H(t, θ) ·
[
1 +O
(
1
θ
)]
, µ− c1 − σ22 ≤ 0,
(26)
which shows that the total failure rate decreases with age, at least for large enough age, in
agreement with the literature.
4.2 Deviations from Zipf’s law due to the finite age of the economy
Considering, for simplicity, that s˜0 is a degenerate random variable such that Pr[s˜0 = s0] = 1,
we can determine the deviations from the asymptotic power law tail of the mean density of firm
sizes (given explicitly by (66) in appendix A.1) due to the finite age of the economy. For this,
it is convenient to study the s-dependence of the mean number of firms whose sizes exceeds a
given level s:
N(s, t) =
∫ ∞
s
g(s′, t)ds′ . (27)
Zipf’s law corresponds to N(s, t) ∼ s−1 for large s.
All calculations done, defining s0(t) := s0ec0·t as being the initial size of an entrant firm at
time t when Pr[s˜0 = s0] = 1, we obtain the number N(κ, τ) of firms whose normalized size
6Mathematically speaking, this hazard rate can be derived form the generic formula that gives the probability
that a Brownian motion {Xt}t≥0 with negative drift, started from X0 > 0, crosses for the first time the lower
barrier X = 0.
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Figure 2: The figure quantifies the deviations from Zipf’s law resulting from the finite age of
the economy, by showing the mean number N(κ, τ) of firms of normalized size s/s0(t) larger
than κ as a function of κ, for parameters µ = c0, d + h = 0 (satisfying the balance condition),
and for s0 = 100 · smin, c0 = c1 = 0 and reduced times τ := σ2θ/2 = 5; 10; 50. The exact
asymptotic Zipf’s law ∼ κ−1 is also shown for comparison.
s
s0(t)
is larger than κ at the standardized age τ := σ2
2
θ,
N(κ, τ) = B− κ−̺− +B+ κ+̺+ − C , (28)
where
B− :=
1
2α(η)̺−
[
erfc
(
lnκ− τα(η)
2
√
τ
)
−
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)−α(η)
erfc
(
ln(κρ2)− τα(η)
2
√
τ
)]
,
B+ :=
1
2α(η)̺+
[
erfc
(
ln κ+ τα(η)
2
√
τ
)
−
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)α(η)
erfc
(
ln(κρ2) + τα(η)
2
√
τ
)]
,
C :=
1
2η
e−ητ
[
erfc
(
ln κ− τα
2
√
τ
)
−
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)−α
erfc
(
ln(κρ2)− τα
2
√
τ
)]
,
(29)
and ̺± := 12 [α± α (η)], α := 2 · µ−c0σ2 − 1, α(η) :=
√
α2 + 4η, η := σ
2
2
(d+ h).
Figure 2 shows the mean cumulative number N(κ, τ) of firms as a function of the normal-
ized firm size κ, for µ = c0 and h = −d > 0 satisfying to the balance condition of corollary 1,
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for s0 = 100 · smin, c0 = c1 = 0 and reduced times τ = 5, 10, 50. As expected, the older
the economy, the closer is the mean cumulative number N(κ, τ) to Zipf’s law N(κ,∞) ∼ κ−1.
Beyond τ = 50, there are no noticeable difference between the actual distribution of firm sizes
and its asymptotic power law counterpart. This illustrates graphically the last point discussed
in remark 5 that, the larger the volatility (beyond some threshold), the faster the convergence
of the size distribution toward the asymptotic power law. Indeed, the larger the volatility, the
smaller the age θ necessary to reach a value of τ close to 50.
The downward curvatures of the graphs for all finite τ ’s show that the apparent tail index
can be empirically found larger than 1 even if all conditions for the asymptotic validity of Zipf’s
law hold. This effect could provide an explanation for some dissenting views in the literature
about Zipf’s law. The two recent influential studies by Cabral and Mata (2003) and Eeckhout
(2004)7have suggested that the distribution of firm and of city sizes could be well-approached
by the log-normal distribution, which exhibits a downward curvature in a double-logarithmic
scale often used to qualify a power law. Our model shows that a slight downward curvature
can easily be explained by the partial convergence of the distribution of firm sizes toward the
asymptotic Zipf’s law due to the finite age of the economy.
It is interesting to note that two opposing effects can combine to make the apparent exponent
m close to 1 even when the balance condition does not hold exactly. Consider the situation
where ε := d+h
µ−c0 < 1. For ε < 1, figure 1 shows that m is always less than one. But, figure 2
shows that the distribution of firm sizes for a finite economy is approximately a power law but
with an exponent larger than one for the asymptotic regime of an infinitely old economy. It is
possible that these two deviations may cancel out to a large degree, providing a nice apparent
empirical Zipf’s law.
4.3 Representativeness of the mean-distribution of firm size
All our results have been established for the average number N(s, t) of firms whose size is
larger than s, where the average is performed over an ensemble of equivalent statistical real-
7See the comment by Levy (2009) which suggests that the extreme tail of the size distribution is indeed a power
law and the reply by Eeckhout (2009).
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izations of the economy. Since empirical data are usually sampled from a single economy, it is
important to ascertain if the average Zipf’s law accurately describes the distribution of single
typical economies. The answer to this question is provided by the following proposition whose
proof is given in appendix A.3.
Proposition 4. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the random number N˜(s, t) of firms whose size is
larger than s in a given economy follows a Poisson law with parameter N(s, t) (defined in (40)
with (45) and (67)):
Pr
[
N˜(s, t) = n
]
=
N(s, t)n
n!
e−N(s,t). (30)
As a consequence of proposition 4, we state
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of proposition 4, the variance of the average relative
distance N˜(s,t)
N(s,t)
− 1 between the number of firms in one realization and its statistical average is
given by
E


(
N˜(s, t)
N(s, t)
− 1
)2 = 1
N(s, t)
. (31)
Proof. The left hand side of the equation above is nothing but the variance of N˜(s, t) divided
by N(s, t)2. Since, N˜(s, t) follows a Poisson law, Var N˜(s, t) = N(s, t), hence the result.
To give a quantitative illustration, let us consider firms whose sizes evolve according to the
pure Geometric Brownian Motion, i.e., Pr[s˜0 = s0] = 1, c0 = c1 = h = d = 0 and no minimum
exit size. Then, N(s, t) = N(s) =
∫∞
s
g(s′)ds′, where
g(s) =
ν0∣∣µ− σ2
2
∣∣ s1−
2µ
σ2
0 s
2µ
σ2
−2 , s > s0 , µ <
σ2
2
. (32)
This expression derives from the general expression (66) for Zipf’s law given in appendix A.1
in the limit smin → 0. This leads to
N(s) = N0
(s0
s
)1− 2µ
σ2
, (33)
where
N0 =
∫ ∞
s0
g(s)ds =
σ2
2
· ν0
(µ− σ2
2
)2
(34)
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Figure 3: Number of firms whose size is larger than s when σ = 0.01, ν0 = 50 and µ = 0 for
ten realizations of the economy. The straight red line depicts Zipf’s law for the mean number
of firms.
is the mean number of firms, whose sizes, at a given time t, are larger than the initial size
s0. Using (31) for the variance of the relative distance between the number of firms in one
realization and its statistical average in Corollary 2, and with (33), we obtain that the variance
of the relative distance is given by 1
N0
s
s0
, where we have assumed that µ = 0, so that Zipf’s law
N(s) ∼ s−1 holds for the mean distribution of firm sizes.
In this illustrative example, the total number of firms is infinite while N0 remains finite. Let
us consider a data set spanning the range s ∈ (s0, s∗) where s∗ = 0.01N0 s0 is such that the
variance of the relative distance between the number of firms in one realization and its statistical
average remains smaller than 10−2 over the range s ∈ (s0, s∗). Suppose that the mean number
of firms in the economy, whose sizes are larger than s0, is equal to N0 = 106. Then s∗ = 104 s0,
showing that Zipf’s law should be observed, in a single realization of an economy, with good
accuracy over four orders of magnitudes in this example. Figure 3 depicts ten simulation results
obtained for such an economy.
27
5 Conclusion
We have presented a general theoretical derivation of Zipf’s law, which states that, for most
countries, the size distribution of firms is a power law with a specific exponent equal to 1:
the number of firms with size greater than S is inversely proportional to S. Our framework
has taken into account time-varying firm creation, firms’ exit resulting from both a lack of
sufficient size and sudden external shocks, and Gibrat’s law of proportional growth. We have
identified that four key parameters control the tail index m of the power law distribution of
firms sizes: the expected growth rate µ of incumbent firms, the hazard rate h of random exits
of firms of any size, the growth rate c0 of the size of entrant firms, and the growth rate d
of the number of new firms. We have identified that Zipf’s law holds exactly when a balance
condition holds, namely when the growth rate d+c0 of investments in new entrant firms is equal
to the average growth rate µ − h of incumbent firms. Thus, Zipf’s law can be interpreted as
a remarkable statistical signature of the long-term optimal allocation of resources that ensures
the maximum sustainable growth rate of an economy. We have also found that Zipf’s law is
recovered approximately when the volatility of the growth rate of individual firms becomes very
large, even when the balance condition does not hold exactly. We have studied the deviations
from Zipf’s law due to the finite age of the economy and shown that a deviation of the balance
condition d + c0 = µ − h can be compensated approximately by the effect of the finite age of
the economy to give again an approximate Zipf’s law. We have also shown that the presence
of a minimum size below which firms exit allows us to account for the age-dependent hazard
rate documented in the empirical literature. Our results hold not only for statistical averages
over ensemble of economies (i.e., in expectations) but also apply to a single typical economy,
as the variance of the relative difference between the number of firms in one realization and its
statistical average decays as the inverse of the number of firms and thus goes to zero very fast
for sufficiently large economies. Therefore, our results can be compared with empirical data
which are usually sampled for a single economy. Our theory improves significantly on previous
works by getting rid of many constraints and conditions that are found unnecessary or artificial,
when taking into account the proper interplay between birth, death and growth.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the distribution of firms’ sizes: proof of proposition 1
Consider an economy with many firms born at random times ti ≥ t0, i ∈ N, where t0 is the
starting time of the economy. We assume that no two firms are born at the same time so that
the random sequence {ti}i∈N defines a simple point process (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2007, def.
3.3.II).
Let Si(t), i ∈ N, t ≥ t0 be a positive real-valued stochastic process representing the size,
at time t, of the firm born at ti. Obviously, Si(t) = 0, ∀t < ti. The sequence {ti, Si(t)}i∈N
defines a simple marked point process (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2007, def. 6.4.I - 6.4.II) with
ground process {ti}i∈N and marks {Si(t)}i∈N. We assume that {ti} and {Si(t)} are mutually
independent and such that the distribution of Si(t) depends only on the corresponding location
in time ti. Consequently, the mark kernel Fm,i(s, t) := Pr [Si(t) < s] simplifies to Fm (s, t|ti).
For any subset T × Σ of [t0,∞)× R+, we introduce the counting measure
Nt (T × Σ) := # {ti ∈ T, Si(t) ∈ Σ} , (35)
=
∑
i∈N: ti∈T
1Si(t)∈Σ . (36)
The total number of firms whose sizes are larger than s at time t then reads
N˜(s, t) := Nt ([t0, t)× [s,∞)) , (37)
=
∫
[t0,t)×[s,∞)
Nt(du× ds), (38)
=
∑
i∈N: ti≤t
1Si(t)≥s . (39)
As a consequence of theorem 6.4.IV.c in Daley and Vere-Jones (2007) we can state that
Lemma 1. Provided that the ground process {ti}i∈N admits a first order moment measure with
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density ν(t) w.r.t Lebesgue measure, the counting process N˜(s, t) admits a first moment
N(s, t) := E
[
N˜(s, t)
]
, (40)
=
∫ t
t0
[1− Fm (s, t|u)] · ν(u) du. (41)
Remark 7. When the ground process is an (inhomogeneous) Poisson process, ν(t) is nothing
but the intensity of the process.
Proof. By theorem 6.4.IV.c in Daley and Vere-Jones (2007), the first-moment measureM1(·) :=
E [Nt(·)] of the marked point process {ti, Si(t)}i∈N exists since the corresponding moment mea-
sure exists for the ground process {ti}i∈N. It reads
M1 (du× ds) = ν(u)du · Fm(ds, t|u). (42)
As a consequence
N(s, t) = E
[∫
[t0,t)×[s,∞)
Nt(du× ds)
]
=
∫
[t0,t)×[s,∞)
M1 (du× ds) , (43)
=
∫
[t0,t)×[s,∞)
ν(u)du · Fm(ds, t|u) =
∫ t
t0
[1− Fm (s, t|u)] · ν(u) du. (44)
As an immediate consequence, provided that S(t) admits a density fm(s, t|u) with respect
to Lebesgue measure, the counting process N˜(s, t) admits a first-moment density
g(s, t) :=
∫ t
t0
fm (s, t|u) · ν(u) du. (45)
This first-moment density does not sum up to one but to a valueN∞(t) = lims→0N(s, t), which
remains finite for all finite t. A sufficient condition is that the growths of the number of firms
and of their sizes are not faster than exponential in time, in agreement with condition (ıı) in
proposition 1. Many faster-than-exponential growth processes of the number of firms and of
their sizes are also permitted, as long as they do not lead to finite-time singularities.
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Lemma 2. Under the assumptions 1, 2 and 5, the first-moment density of sizes of all the firms
existing at the current time t reads
g(s, t) =
∫ t
t0
ν(u)e−h·(t−u)f(s, t|u)du , t > t0 , (46)
where t0(> t∗) is the starting time of the economy (with t∗ given by (4)) and f(s, t|u) is the
probability density function of a firm’s size at time t and born at time u.
Proof. Assumptions 1 and 2 are enough for lemma 1 to hold. Besides, by assumption 5, the
exit rate of a firm is independent from its size so that fm(s, t|u) = e−h(t−u) · f(s, t|u), where
f(s, t|u) denotes the probability density function of a firm’s size at time t and born at time
u.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that, in order to derive proposition 1, we just need to consider the
law of a single firm’s size, given that it has not yet crossed the level smin(t). The density of a
single firm’s size, that is solution to equation (3) embodying Gibrat’s law, for a firm born at time
ti = t − θi and given the condition that the firm’s size Si(t, θi) is larger than smin(t), ∀θi ≥ 0,
is given by the following result.
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions 2, 3 and 4, the probability density function f (s, t|t− θ, s˜0 = s0)
of a firm’s size at time t and aged θ conditional on s˜0 = s0, taking into account the condition
that the firm would die if its size would reach the exit level smin(t), is
f (s, t|t− θ, s˜0 = s0) = 1
2
√
πτs
[
exp
(
− 1
4τ
(
ln
(
s
smin(t)
)
− ln
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)
− (δ − 1− δ0)τ
)2)
−
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)−(δ−1−δ0)( s
smin(t)
)δ0−δ1
exp
(
− 1
4τ
(
ln
(
s
smin(t)
)
+ ln
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)
− (δ − 1− δ0)τ
)2)]
,
(47)
where
s0(t) := s0e
c0·t , τ :=
σ2
2
θ , δ :=
2µ
σ2
, δ0 :=
2c0
σ2
, δ1 :=
2c1
σ2
. (48)
Proof. Let us consider a firm born at time u = t−θ, where t denotes the current time and θ ≥ 0
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is the age of the firm. The firm’s size S(θ, u) is given by the following stochastic process
S(θ, u) = s0(u)e
c·θ+σW (θ) , (49)
where θ = t− u, W (θ) is a standard Wiener process, while s0(u) is the initial size of the firm,
given s˜0 = s0, and c := µ − σ22 . The process (49) with the initial and boundary conditions in
assumptions 2 and 4 can be reformulated as
S(θ, u) = smin(u+ θ)e
Z(θ,u) , (50)
where
Z(θ, u) = ln ρ(u+ θ) + (c− c1)θ + σW (θ), ρ(t) := s0(t)
smin(t)
. (51)
As a consequence,
f (s, t|u, s˜0 = s0) = 1
s
ϕ
[
ln
(
s
smin(t)
)
, θ; u
]
, (52)
where ϕ(z; θ, u) denotes the density of Z(θ, u) which is solution to
∂ϕ(z; θ, u)
∂θ
+ (c− c1)∂ϕ(z; θ, u)
∂z
=
σ2
2
∂2ϕ(z; θ, u)
∂z2
,
ϕ(z; θ = 0, u) = δ(z − ln ρ(u)) ,
ϕ(z = 0; θ, u) = 0 , θ > 0 .
(53)
These initial and boundary conditions are equivalent to the initial and boundary conditions in
assumptions 2 and 4. Using any textbook on stochastic processes (Redner, 2001, for instance),
we get
ϕ(z; θ, u) =
1
2
√
πτ
exp
(
−(z − ln ρ(u)− (δ − 1− δ1)τ)
2
4τ
)
−
[ρ(u)]δ1−δ+1
2
√
πτ
exp
(
−(z + ln ρ(u)− (δ − 1− δ1)τ)
2
4τ
)
,
(54)
where δ and τ are defined in (48). Taking into account the relation
ρ(u) = ρ(t)e(δ1−δ0)τ , (55)
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we rewrite expression (54) as
ϕ(z; θ, u) =
1
2
√
πτ
exp
(
−(z − ln ρ(t)− (δ − 1− δ0)τ)
2
4τ
)
−
[ρ(t)]δ0−δ+1
2
√
πτ
exp
(
−(z + ln ρ(t)− (δ − 1− δ0)τ)
2
4τ
+ (δ0 − δ1)z
)
,
(56)
By substitution in (52), this concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
Performing the change of variable from birthdate u to age θ = t−u in (46), and accounting
for assumption 1, i.e. the fact that ν(t) = ν0 ed·t , leads to
g(s, t) = ν(t)
∫ θ0
0
e−(d+h)θE [f (s, t|t− θ, s˜0)] dθ , (57)
where θ0 = t− t0 is the age of the given economy. E [f (s; t, |t− θ, s˜0)] denotes the statistical
average of f (s; t, θ|s˜0) over the random variable s˜0. Inasmuch as t0 should not be smaller than
t∗ given by (4), we should thus have θ0 < θ∗ := lnρ(t)c0−c1 .
As a byproduct, the mean density of firm sizes, conditional on s˜0 = s0 is
g (s, t|s˜0 = s0) = ν(t)
∫ θ0
0
e−(d+h)θf (s, t|t− θ, s˜0 = s0) dθ . (58)
Thus, substituting (47) into (58) yields
g(s, t|s˜0 = s0) = ν˜(t)
s
G
(
ln
(
s
smin(t)
)
; t, τ0
)
, ν˜(t) =
2ν(t)
σ2
, (59)
with
G(z; t, τ0) :=
∫ τ0
0
e−ητϕ(z; t, τ)dτ , (60)
where ϕ(z; t, θ) is given by (54) while
τ0 :=
σ2
2
θ0 (τ0 < τ∗) , η :=
2
σ2
(d+ h) . (61)
The substitution of ϕ(z; t, θ) from (54) into the integral (60) leads to two integrals, which can
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be reduced to
I(z, θ, α, β) :=
∫ θ
0
exp
(
−(z − ατ)
2
4τ
− βτ
)
dτ
2
√
πτ
, (62)
whose expression can be obtained by the tabulated integral (7.4.33) in Abramowitz and Stegun
(1965) by the change of variable u = √τ . This leads to
G(z; t, τ0) =
1
2α(η)
×
{
e
1
2
(αz
−
−α(η)|z
−
|)erfc
( |z−| − τ0α(η)
2
√
τ0
)
− e 12 (αz−+α(η)|z−|)erfc
( |z−|+ τ0α(η)
2
√
τ0
)
−
ρ(t)−α
[
e
1
2
(αz+−α(η)|z+|)erfc
( |z+| − τ0α(η)
2
√
τ0
)
− e 12 (αz++α(η)|z+|)erfc
( |z+|+ τ0α(η)
2
√
τ0
)]}
,
(63)
with
α := δ− 1− δ0 , α(η) :=
√
α2 + 4η , z− := ln
s
s0(t)
, z+ := ln
s · s0(t)
smin(t)2
. (64)
For an old enough economy, i.e., when √τ0 ≫ 1/α(η), we can expand expression (63) to
obtain
G∞(z; t) =
1
α(η)
[
e
1
2
(αz
−
−α(η)|z
−
|) − ρ(t)−αe 12 (αz+−α(η)|z+|)
]
. (65)
Substituting this last expression into equation (59) for the mean density of firms sizes, and after
making explicit the s-dependence of the variable z, we finally get
g(s, t|s˜0 = s0) = ν˜(t)
sα(η)


(
s
s0(t)
) 1
2
(α−α(η)) (
1−
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)−α(η))
, s > s0(t) ,
(
s
s0(t)
) 1
2
(α+α(η))
−
(
s0(t)
smin(t)
)−α(η) (
s
s0(t)
) 1
2
(α−α(η))
, s0(t) > s > smin(t) .
(66)
for large τ0 ≫ α(η)−1, with s0(t) = s0ec0·t, as defined by (48).
According to assumption 2, the expectation of g(s, t|s˜0) with respect to s˜0 provides us with
the unconditional mean density of firm sizes
g(s, t) ≈ ν˜(t)
sα(η)
·
(
E [s˜m0 ]
1/m ec0·t
s
)m
, as s→∞ and t→∞ , (67)
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where m is given by (7). This expression (67) justifies the statement of proposition 1 and
concludes the proof.
A.2 Growth rate of the overall economy: Proof of proposition 2
Using the same machinery as in appendix A.1, we define the total size of the economy at time
t as
Ω˜(t) :=
∑
i∈N: ti≤t
Si(t)
=
∫ t
t0
s ·Nt(du× ds) . (68)
Under the assumptions of proposition 1, by theorem 6.4.V.iii in Daley and Vere-Jones (2007),
we get
Ω(t) := E
[
Ω˜(t)
]
(69)
= ν(t)
∫ τ0
0
e−η·τE [S(t, τ)] dτ . (70)
For simplicity, let us consider the case where smin = 0. This assumption is not necessary, but
greatly simplifies the calculation. Under this assumption, the size of an incumbent firm follows
a geometric Brownian motion so that
E [S(t, τ)] = s0(t)e
(δ−δ0)τ , (71)
where δ, δ0 and s0(t) are defined in (48). Substituting (71) into (70) gives
Ω(t) = ν(t) · s0(t)
∫ t
0
e(µ−c0−h−d)udu , (72)
=
∫ t
0
e(µ−h)·(t−u)ν(u) · s0(u)du , (73)
=
∫ t
0
e(µ−h)·(t−u)dI(u) . (74)
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This last equation shows that µ− h is the return on investment of the economy. By integration,
we get the limit growth rate of the economy
lim
t→∞
d ln Ω(t)
dt
=


µ− h , µ− h > d+ c0
d+ c0 , µ− h ≤ d+ c0
. (75)
This concludes the proof of proposition 2 when smin = 0. When smin 6= 0 and grows at the
rate c1 ≥ 0, the result can still be proved along the same lines but at the price of more tedious
calculations since the expectation in (71) involves eight error functions.
A.3 Representativeness of the mean-distribution of firm size: Proof of
proposition 4
The proof of proposition 4 follows from lemma 6.4.VI in Daley and Vere-Jones (2007) which
states that a marked point process that has mark kernel Fm(s, t|u), and for which the Poisson
ground process has intensity measure ν(u)du, is equivalent to a Poisson process on the product
space with intensity measure Λ(du× ds) = Fm(ds, t|u) · ν(u)du.
Thus, under the assumptions 1 and 2, using the notations of appendix A.1, the marked
point process {ti, Si(t)}i∈N is a compound Poisson process with intensity measure Λ(du× ds).
Consequently
Pr
[
N˜(s, t) = n
]
= Pr [Nt ([t0, t)× [s,∞)) = n] ,
=
(∫
[t0,t)×[s,∞) Fm(ds, t|u) · ν(u)du
)n
n!
exp
(
−
∫
[t0,t)×[s,∞)
Fm(ds, t|u) · ν(u)du
)
,
=
N(t, s)n
n!
· e−N(s,t), (76)
by lemma 1.
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